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Abstract
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) protein and glucose examinations are usually performed in chemical pathology departments on autoanalysers. Tuberculo-
sis (TB) is a group 3 biological agent under Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament but in the biochemistry laboratory, no extra precautions 
are taken in its analysis in possible TB cases. The issue of laboratory practice and safety in the biochemical analyses of CSF specimens, when tubercu-
losis infection is in question is addressed in the context of ambiguity in the implementation of current national and international health and safety 
regulations. Additional protective measures for laboratory staff during the analysis of CSF TB samples should force a change in current laboratory 
practice and become a regulatory issue under ISO 15189. Annual Mantoux skin test or an interferon-γ release assay for TB should be mandatory for 
relevant staff. This manuscript addresses the issue of biochemistry laboratory practice and safety in the biochemical analyses of CSF specimens when 
tuberculosis infection is in question in the context of the ambiguity of statutory health and safety regulations.
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Introduction
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) protein and glucose ex-
aminations in confirmed and possible cases of tu-
berculosis (TB) are carried out in the chemical pa-
thology laboratory. CSF protein is normally de-
rived from plasma and protein levels are < 1% of 
plasma levels (1). CSF glucose is normally about 
60% of plasma levels. The normal CSF/plasma glu-
cose ratio varies from 0.3 to 0.9 with variation in 
CSF glucose in response to changes in blood glu-
cose reflecting a lag phase in CSF/blood equilibri-
um time. During the recovery phase in the treat-
ment of meningitis, CSF glucose normalizes before 
protein levels and cell counts. Patients with chron-
ic tuberculous meningitis have abnormal CSF with 
lymphocytic pleocytosis, decreased glucose and 
increased protein (2). In routine practice, CSF bio-
chemical analyses in meningitis may include lac-
tate, C-reactive protein, adenosine deaminase and 
lactate dehydrogenase.  
This manuscript addresses the issue of biochemis-
try laboratory practice and safety in the biochemi-
cal analyses of CSF specimens when tuberculosis 
infection is in question in the context of the ambi-
guity of statutory health and safety regulations. 
The Health and Safety Authority in Ireland has for-
mally challenged the safety of current laboratory 
practice in the biochemical analysis of CSF sam-
ples where group 3 biological agents are con-
cerned and the issue has implications across the 
European Union. A “group 3 biological agent” may 
cause severe human disease and represents a seri-
ous hazard to employees thus presenting a risk of 
spreading to the community, although there is 
usually effective prophylaxis or treatment availa-
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ble. By contrast, a group 1 biological agent is un-
likely to cause disease to employees and a group 2 
agent can cause disease to employees although it 
is unlikely to spread to the community and there is 
usually effective prophylaxis or treatment available. 
Tuberculosis, laboratory health and 
safety and regulation
Tuberculosis is a group 3 biological agent as listed 
in Code of Practice for the Safety, Health and Wel-
fare at Work (Biological Agent) Regulations 2013 in 
Ireland. These Regulations transpose Directive 
2000/54/EC of the European Parliament. Contain-
ment restrictions are required by the regulations. 
Regulation 3 (1) states: ..”these Regulations and any 
relevant code of practice, apply to activities in a place 
of work where existing or potential, whether deliber-
ate or incidental, exposure to a biological agent has 
occurred or may occur” (3).
Schedule 2 of the Safety Health and Welfare (Bio-
logical Agents) regulations lists the measures for 
prevention and risk reduction. There is a require-
ment to design work processes and engineering 
control measures to avoid or minimize the risk of 
the release of a biological agent into the place of 
work. Hygiene measures must be used to prevent 
or reduce accidental transfer or release of a biolog-
ical agent from the place of work. Collective and 
individual protective measures must be used 
where exposure cannot be avoided by other 
means. A further requirement is unclear and states 
that “the testing, where necessary and technically 
possible, for the presence, outside the primary physi-
cal confinement, of a biological agent used at work” 
(4). In the context of TB, the requirements seem to 
require special suited protection, a negative air 
pressure safety cabinet and a separate area for TB 
biochemical testing. 
Are these requirements current practice in general 
hospital laboratories? From enquiries in Ireland 
and the UK, the answer appears to be No!
Conventional practice
There are no special precautions with regard to bi-
ochemistry sample analysis and infectivity listed 
or referred to in Henry’s textbook with regard to 
cases where TB is a differential in the diagnosis (1). 
The TB reference laboratory in Ireland does not 
recommend any particular laboratory precautions 
such as negative pressure fume cupboards and full 
masks and gowns. Neither do the Canadian, UK or 
Indian or United States Guidelines (5-8). 
Lack of evidence of laboratory staff 
infection
In a survey of laboratory staff in the UK, two cases 
of TB were reported in a biochemistry department 
within 18,310 person years of exposure. Details 
were not provided (9). While there is a theoretic 
risk, it must be witheringly small. In contrast, the 
risk to nurses even in short contact with an infec-
tious patient is real. In 2012, there were 364 cases 
of tuberculosis reported in Ireland of which 3 
(0.8%) were TB meningitis. 
The literature on laboratory associated infections 
reveals 5,346 such infections between 1930 and 
2000. These cases appear to refer to microbiology 
processes overwhelmingly. Historic data from the 
United States in the period from 1930 to 1950 
found a total of 775 cases of laboratory-acquired 
infections of which 153 were TB. World data from 
1950 to 1963 revealed 191 cases of which 21 were 
TB. In a literature survey covering 1979–2004, there 
were 1,141 laboratory acquired infections of which 
199 were Mycobacterium tuberculosis (10). Data 
from England and Wales found that laboratory 
workers showed a 5.4 times increased risk of ac-
quiring TB compared to the general population 
with the highest risk ratio 7.5 among technical 
staff.
Surveillance precautions
The US Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report is-
sued guidelines on the prevention of transmission 
of TB in healthcare settings in 2005. Laboratory 
workers should be screened for TB if they share 
airspace with an infected person or if they partici-
pate in suspected or confirmed TB specimen pro-
cessing. As a surveillance precaution, all health 
care workers should have baseline TB screening 
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on job commencement using a two-step tubercu-
lin skin test or a single whole blood gamma inter-
feron assay. Annual clinical appraisals should then 
be carried out. Medical scientists may need respir-
atory protection depending on the type of ventila-
tion in use in the laboratory and the likelihood of 
aerosolization of viable TB as a result of a labora-
tory procedure (11). 
Codes of practice
In the US, Biosafety in Microbiological and Bio-
medical Laboratories (BMBL) has become the code 
of practice for biosafety (12). No reference is made 
to processing CSF specimens in a biochemistry au-
toanalyser but any maneuver that produces an 
aerosol heightens the infection risk. The require-
ment for tuberculosis is that “all aerosol-generating 
activities must be conducted in a biological safety 
cabinet”. Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) practices and 
procedures seems the safest protocol to adopt but 
in practice, how will this be applied to biochemical 
analyses of CSF samples? The availability of simple, 
easy to use, point-of-care testing devices allow the 
routine use of biological safety cabinets for CSF 
glucose analysis but low levels of protein are be-
yond the device sensitivities. 
In England, TB is in hazard Group 3 and must be 
processed in a microbiological safety cabinet un-
der full containment level 3 conditions. Does this 
happen with biochemical analyses in English or 
Irish hospitals? No!
A detailed public health report from Belgium in 
2006, described common laboratory methodolo-
gies involved in TB analysis but biochemical auto-
analysers did not feature (13). 
Current analytical practice
The Beckman Coulter AU 5400 autoanalyser (Bath, 
UK) is used for estimation of CSF glucose and pro-
tein in this institution. Aerosol micro-droplets are 
possible in the process of autopipetting a speci-
men aliquot into the cuvette and also at the rea-
gent mixing stage. All infectious blood specimens 
involving HIV, HepB, HepC and unknown are treat-
ed in a similar manner. It is impossible to eliminate 
all risk from infectious pathogens. 
Accreditation challenge and improved safety 
monitoring
ISO 15189 accreditation inspectors have not fo-
cused or commented on this issue to date. Will the 
precautionary principle be applied with CSF glu-
cose and protein analysis being performed in neg-
ative pressure cabinets with staff in space suits us-
ing specially designated equipment or will com-
mon sense prevail and current practice continue?  
It is possible that additional preventive measures 
for biochemical analyses of TB specimens will be-
come the norm because health and safety regula-
tions specify more stringent precautions than are 
currently in widespread practice. Where suitably 
sensitive point-of-care devices for relevant bio-
chemical analytes become available, these can be 
used in the negative air pressure biological safety 
cabinets in the microbiology departments which 
would divert the issue away from biochemistry 
technologists. 
Concluding recommendation for staff
Staff involved in testing of TB specimens in clinical 
chemistry laboratories as well as those in microbi-
ology laboratories should have baseline screening 
for TB on job commencement and follow-up an-
nual clinical appraisals. Annual Mantoux skin test 
or an interferon-γ release assay should be done to 
check for conversion. Those with positive results 
should have a chest X-ray and appropriate treat-
ment. These annual staff tests are not done in Clin-
ical Chemistry departments at present. 
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